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SEMANTIC SHRUBBERY IN THE TAX OFFICIAL'S INFIELD:
AMBIGUOUS EXEMPTIONS
BY RICHARD H. WAGNER*
The debate on the nature and scope of tax exemptions to be granted
Pennsylvania industrial enterprises may soon shift from the judicial to the
legislative forum. Among the issues to be decided is whether the reasons
originally considered sufficient to justify tax exemptions for "manufacturers"
will furnish equal justification for granting exemptions: (1) to establishments
in the business of performing services for manufacturers-for instance,
electroplaters, metal heat treaters and scrap yards, and (2) to other firms
not considered to be manufacturers or servicing manufacturers such as estab-
lishments which process and package human food and animal feed (fruit and
vegetable canners, meat packers, grain mills, etc.), and commercial enter-
prises, such as laundries and cleaning and dyeing establishments, which serve
the general public.'
* Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law, 1946-1958, Assistant Attorney
General, Chief Counsel, Bureau of Sales and Use Tax, Pennsylvania Department of
Revenue. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent those of the Commonwealth.
1. Pennsylvania's Capital Stock Tax Act (on domestic corporations) and Franchise
Tax Act (on foreign corporations) contain provisions for the exemption of corporations
engaged in "manufacturing." Dormant for a period, these exemptions became effective
again for 1958 and later years. Similar exemptions appear in local mercantile license
and general business taxes. The courts have held that to qualify as a manufacturer, a
person must be in the business of making something, i.e., transforming materials into
a new and different product. See Rosenbluth, Pennsylvania Business Taxes, 36 A.L.I.
PROCEEDINGS (1959). The Sales and Use Tax Act defines the word "manufacturing" as
"The performance of manufacturing, fabricating, compounding, processing or other oper-
ations, engaged in as a business, which place any personal property in a form, com-
position or character different from that in which it is acquired": PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
72, § 3403-2(c) (1956). The industries mentioned in the text have contended that they
should be exempt because their operations made significant changes in personal prop-
erty. However, the Bureau of Sales and Use Tax has interpreted this provision as a
legislative expression of the familiar transformation test applied by the courts. The
Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, sitting as the Commonwealth Court,
upheld the Bureau's interpretation in Commonwealth v. Donovan Co., No. 155, Com-
monwealth Ct. Pa., Dec. 2, 1960. The Court stated: "If the manufacturing exemption
is construed as the taxpayer urges here, the Commonwealth could not collect tax from
any business which performs any work upon personal property. It is safe to assume
that the revenues derived from the tax under such an interpretation would be seriously
reduced. We cannot believe the Legislature intended such an interpretation." (The
business of the company in this case was heat treating metal objects to increase their
hardness.)
In addition to the general exemption on property purchased for resale in its
original form or as a component of other property to be sold, the Selective Sales and
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That the basic issues in this debate cannot be resolved satisfactorily
through the determination of such relatively narrow issues, as the meaning
of questioned language in existing statutes or the tax status of this or that
particular establishment, is apparent from the arguments advanced in pend-
ing appeals and recent discussions of this subject.
2
These arguments, being extra-legal in nature, are not within the normal
area of judicial review. What answer shall be given to proposals that exemp-
tions should be granted to job-creating businesses, especially in "depressed
areas" (also referred to as "excess labor-markets"), in order to encourage
the economic growth of such areas? What consideration should be given to
the argument that the unfavorable competitive position of a local industry
calls for tax advantages to place it on a par with out-of-state competitors?
In considering an industry's claim for exemption from one tax, what weight
should be given to the fact that it has received or not received other tax
exemptions? Where should the line be drawn (if any distinction shall be
made) between "industrial" and "commercial" enterprises in granting tax
relief? If reasons are found for granting tax relief to certain business activi-
ties, should the relief be total or partial? And always, there is the overriding
question-where shall the tax burden be shifted to raise revenues for educa-
tion and other requisite public expenditures if exemptions are granted or
enlarged with respect to certain classes of taxpayers? Clearly, questions such
as these are best debated in the legislative halls rather than in courtrooms.
When the facts basic to these arguments have been analyzed, weighed,
decided, and implemented by legislation, it is to be hoped that the public, to-
gether with state and local officials charged with the duty of administering
tax laws, will be given these decisions in the form of legislation which employs
Use Tax Act also contains exemptions for mine and quarry operators, refineries, pub-
lishers, printers, firms building, rebuilding and repairing ships, farmers, dairies, persons
engaged in horticulture and floriculture, public utilities, radio and television stations,
charitable organizations, religious organizations, non-profit educational institutions,
volunteer firemen's organizations, the United States, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
and its instrumentalities and political subdivisions. The Act also exempts the purchase
of property to be used in research having as its objective the production of a new or
improved product or utility service, or method of producing same.
Under specific statutory provisions, corporations organized for laundering and for
the processing and curing of meats were formerly granted exemption from capital stock
tax. See PA. LAWS 1913, No. 431; PA. LAWS 1929, No. 284; and PA. LAWS 1937, No. 55.
2. See Debate: Selective Sales and Use Tax-The Manufacturing Exemption, 64
D.L.R. 383 (1960). The debate is not confined to sales and use taxes. The same
arguments are made with respect to other taxes. (No opinion is expressed by the attor-
neys for the Bureau as to whether the legislature should grant new exemptions or en-
large or restrict existing exemptions; these are questions of policy for the law makers.
All counsel for the Bureau would do is point out that where the broadening of tax
relief is undertaken by straining the interpretation of laws or the use of ambiguous
language, the lines between taxable subjects and exempt subjects become so blurred it is
impracticable to determine where they lie, with consequent weakening of enforcement
and lack of uniformity in the application of the tax.)
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definitive, understandable language-clear, candid statements of who and
what is taxed, and who and what is exempt from tax.
In amending or revising these exemptions it may be anticipated that
proponents of broader business exemptions, in view of the above mentioned
arguments, will ask the legislature to rewrite the present "manufacturing"
exemption as "industrial" exemptions comparable to those appearing in our
realty tax laws.3 It is the purpose of this article to point out the ambiguities
present in, and the controversies which may be expected from, the use of
such terms as "industry," "industrial establishment," etc., if such exemptive
substitutions are made. 4 Attention will also be focused on the correlative
problems concealed in the words "machinery" and "equipment" in tax ex-
emption provisions by reviewing the use of these terms in local realty tax
laws and their corresponding effect.
Prior to 1953, Pennsylvania's realty tax laws provided with regard to
industrial property that the tax should apply to everything that goes to make
up the plant. In other words, the taxable real estate included not only land,
buildings and other structures, fixtures and permanently installed improve-
ments in the form of machinery and equipment, but also everything else com-
prising the plant, whether fixed or loose. This was the combined result of
historically broad tax statutes and a judicial rule known as the "assembled
industrial plant doctrine." Thus, the relevant act as long ago as 1844
provided:
All real estate, to wit: houses, lands, lots of ground and ground
rents, mills and manufactories of all kinds, furnaces, forges, bloom-
eries, distilleries, sugar houses, malt houses, breweries, tan yards,
fisheries and ferries, wharves and other real estate, not exempt by
law from taxation . . . shall be valued and assessed . . . for all state
and county purposes.5
The General County Assessment Law enacted in 1933 and the Fourth to
Eighth Class County Assessment Law of 1943 provided for the taxation of
realty in language practically the same as that of the Act of 1844.6 The
3. Similar requests for enlargement of the "farming" exemption can be expected
from persons engaged in the breeding and raising of game animals, birds and fish, race
horses, and fur bearing animals.
4. For other examples of ambiguous provisions, see Garfinkle, Categorical Defi-
nition of Tangible Personal Property, 62 D.L.R. 1 (1958); Moore, The "Home Rule"
Tax Act-A Solution or Challenge, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 811 (1949); and Brabson,
Analysis of Sales and Use Tax Exemptions-With Comments as to Uniform Applica-
tion, 9 VAND. L. REv. 294, 311-15 (1956).
5. PA. LAWS 1844, No. 318.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-201 (1933) (General County Assessment Law);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5453.201 (1943) (Fourth to Eighth Class 'County Assessment
Law). Assessment of real estate is made at the county level and such assessments are
made either annually or triennially by the county assessing officials. Real estate tax
statements are issued by the various local tax collectors to the registered owner of the
1961]
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the legislature, by using this lan-
guage, had adopted the "assembled industrial plant doctrine" under which
everything comprising an industrial plant, "whether fast or loose" or other-
wise in the nature of a chattel used in the plant, is considered real estate.
7
The assembled industrial plant doctrine had its origin in the field of
mortgage law. If a person who had borrowed money secured by a mortgage on
his plant were free to sell or encumber his movable machinery or equip-
ment without the consent of the mortgagee, it was recognized that this would
jeopardize the value of the mortgage. The courts observed that it would
be neither realistic nor practicable to treat things installed in an industrial
plant as personal property merely because they could be removed and this,
in conjunction with the desire to protect mortgages in the field of industrial
financing and the broad statutory provisions with regard to realty taxes,
evidently accounted for the all-inclusive rule.8
In the 1953 legislative session, substantial changes were made in the
laws relative to local realty taxes upon industrial properties. For the apparent
purpose. of eliminating from local realty taxes those things in industrial
plants which are in the nature of personal property,9 two bills were intro-
duced and finally enacted which provided as follows:
realty. Such statements usually show the assessment, effective rate of tax for county,
borough, city or town and school purposes individually and the total tax due.
Actual application of the realty tax laws was another thing. It has been far from
uniform.
7. Patterson v. Delaware County, 70 Pa. 381 (1872).
8. See Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W. & S. 116 (Pa. 1841) ; Patterson v. Delaware
County, 70 Pa. 381 (1872); Medical Tower Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 104 F.2d 133
(3d Cir. 1939) ; United Laundries, Inc. v. Board of Property Assessment, 359 Pa. 195,
58 A.2d 833 (1948).
The superior court did not agree that the assembled industrial plant doctrine
had any application in the field of taxation. In its decision in the United Laundries
case, the superior court (affirming the decision of the Common Pleas Court of
Allegheny County) stated: "As far as the so-called 'assembled industrial plant doc-
trine' is concerned, the decisions of our appellate courts have applied that doctrine in
cases involving the ownership of real estate or liens thereon. . . . It has never been
extended to tax assessments of real estate. . . . There is no such thing as taxation by
implication." United Laundries, Inc. v. Board of Property Assessment, 161 Pa. Super.
412, 415, 54 A.2d 912, 914 (1947) [rev. 359 Pa. 195, 58 A.2d 833 (1948)].
Statutes affecting the taxation of property in the cities of Philadelphia and Pitts-
burgh made exceptions to this inclusive rule. "Machinery and tools used in manufactur-
ing" were excluded from realty tax in Philadelphia: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 15976
(1915). "Machinery of all kinds" was exempted from tax in Pittsburgh: PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 23104 (1911).
9. See LEGiSLATIV JOURNAL Of 1953 Session, pages 1872 and 2568. Action on
these bills took place on May 5, 13, June 10, 16, 24 and July 6, 1953 and remarks by the
legislators appear on pages 1666-1670, 1870-1872, 2381-2383, 2567-2573, 2804-2829 of the
JOURNAL for 1953.
It was suggested during the legislative discussion that the items removed from realty
tax by this provision could be taxed as personal property by local governments under
the so-called Tax Anything Act of 1947, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 6851-7 (1947).
But since this act bars a local tax on anything which is subject to a state tax, and since
[Vol. 65
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Machinery, tools, appliances, and other equipment contained in any
mill, mine, manufactory or industrial establishment shall not be
included or considered in determining the value of such mill, mine,
manufactory or industrial establishment.'0 (Emphasis added.)
What did the legislature exclude from tax by its use of the words "machinery
and equipment contained in any industrial establishment"? This troublesome
question is divided into two parts: (1) Who is entitled to this exemption;
that is, what types of business enterprise come within the term "industrial
establishment"? (2) What property is excluded by the words "machinery"
and "equipment"? The winds of controversy blow through these issues but
evoke few answers reassuring to revenue collecting agencies. No definitions
or practical standards for solving these problems were furnished in the
amendatory acts, nor do dictionaries resolve the doubts. It is evident that
the total effect of these amendments is to remove a great undefined amount of
property value from taxation-much more than actually was contem-
plated." The difficulties stem from the language and interpretation placed
on "industrial establishment" and "machinery and equipment."
the capital stock tax on domestic corporations and the corporate net income tax on
foreign corporations have been held to be property taxes [Philadelphia v. Samuels, 338
Pa. 321, 12 A.2d 79 (1940)], such a tax would appear to be invalid with regard to in-
corporated businesses subject to these taxes: Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Pittsburgh,
317 Pa. 1, 175 Atd. 691 (1934). Such invalidity would possibly also extend to un-
incorporated businesses because of the uniformity clause: Lawrence Twp. School District
case, 362 Pa. 377, 67 A.2d 372 (1949).
The Tax Anything Act of 1947 also provides that the "aggregate amount of all
taxes . . .imposed by . . . any political subdivision under this section shall not exceed
the amount equal to the product obtained by multiplying the latest total assessed valuation
of real estate in such political subdivisions . . .by" a specified millage: PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 6851 (1947).
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-201 (1953) amending the General County
Assessment Law of 1933; and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5453.201 (1953) amending the
Fourth to Eighth Class County Assessment Law of 1943. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72,
§§ 5020-201 and 5453.201 (1957) also contained provisions to postpone the effect of the
above mentioned provisions to 1956. In 1957, the General County Assessment Law
was further amended: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-201 (1957), which postponed the
exclusion for counties of the second class to 1958 and made it effective only on a 20%
basis for that year. Each year thereafter the exemption is increased another 20% until
1962 at which time full exemption from the tax takes effect. (Actually, this was done
by leaving the 1953 exemptive provision in the Act, and by adding thereafter a provi-
sion imposing tax on 80% of the value of machinery and equipment for the year 1958,
on 60% for 1959, etc., reducing to zero in 1962.) See the Act for more details.
11. See M. P. Acee Co., Inc. v. Allegheny County, 18 Pa. D. & C.2d 449 (1958),
where it appears that some firms have refrained from taking full advantage of the
amendments. (In this case, a suit to compel the allowance of tax exemptions was
brought by the named plaintiff allegedly on behalf of more than 5000 other owners of
industrial plants, but not including some of the larger property owners. The mandatory
nature rather than the scope of the exemption was litigated and the court found "crystal
clear" the effect of the legislation to abolish the tax on machinery and equipment with




The ambiguity of the term "industrial establishment" is illustrated in
cases dealing with the scope of the term "industrial plant." The term "in-
dustry" or "industrial" is used in more than one sense. Sometimes the term
is used broadly to refer to any branch of business for gain or profit. Used in
this sense, it would include not only productive enterprises such as manufac-
tories but also commercial establishments for the sale of property or services
and such establishments as bowling lanes, "health salons," eating places and
amusement parks. Again, the term is employed in a more restrictive sense
which, although broader than the term "manufacturing," does not include
all businesses of the type often described as "commercial" under other laws
such as zoning ordinances. In a case dealing with a tax imposition provision
in 1951, the supreme court considered establishments "such as theatres, cab
companies, service stations, automobile repair companies, restaurants, stores,
office buildings, hotels, beauty shops, banks and self-service laundries."
These, the court indicated were not in its opinion "industrial plants":
Therefore, the fact that the businesses to which plaintiff referred
are sometimes generically called 'industries' is irrelevant to the issue
here raised. The question is whether their establishments are in-
dustrial plants.
The answer to that question is self-evident. By no stretch of imag-
ination could a bank building, a hotel, a theatre or any of the other
business establishments referred to by plaintiff be considered an
industrial plant. It is true that we sometimes speak of 'the movie
industry', 'the hotel industry' or 'the banking industry', but that is
merely a loose use of language to convey the idea that the particular
business is a sizeable one. In spite of that colloquialism, we do not
speak of the buildings housing such businesses as 'industrial plants'.
* . .12 (Emphasis added.)
It is noteworthy that the court, in referring to the enterprises which it
considered not to be "industrial plants" referred to them as "business es-
tablishments'" and that the 1953 exemptive amendments to the realty tax
laws employ the term "establishment" rather than "plant."' 3 Did the drafts-
men select the word "establishment" rather than "plant" with the thought
that industry in the broad sense of any place of business would thereby be
entitled to the benefits of the 1953 exemptions?
The supreme court has applied the terms "industrial" and "industrial
12. North Side Laundry Co. v. Allegheny County Board of Assessment, 366 Pa.
636, 639, 79 A.2d 419, 421 (1951) discussed in 14 U. PTT. L. REv. 261 (1952).
13. In Todd v. Gernert, 223 Pa. 103, 105, 72 Atl. 249 (1909), the court stated:
"That word [plant] is to be given its ordinary sense of property owned or used in
carrying on some trade or business. Men speak daily of the plant of a foundry, factory,
mill or railroad, but the term has not yet been applied to a row of dwellings where
the business carried on is housekeeping."
[Vol. 65
AMBIGUOUS EXEMPTIONS
plant" to service enterprises performing work for the general public which
the court itself has described as "commercial" enterprises. Thus, the court
has held that "commercial laundries" are "industrial plants," and the same
has been held with respect to rug cleaners. 14 At the time these cases were
decided, commercial laundries objected to being called "industrial plants"
because under the former realty tax act and the assembled industrial plant
rule this meant that everything inside the plant, even loose equipment, was
considered taxable realty. However, under the acts of 1953, all commercial
and business taxpayers have an incentive for being classed as "industrial
establishments" because this now means they can claim that almost every-
thing contained within their establishments is exempt. Thus, cases which held
that certain establishments were within the industrial plant concept when the
effect of the rule was to impose tax are now usable as precedents where the
effect of the rule is the exact opposite, viz., to exempt from tax.
The superior court did not regard commercial laundries as coming within
the meaning of the term "industrial plant." In its opinion in United Laun-
dries, Inc., the court stated: "The 'assembled industrial plant doctrine' has
been applied in all our cases to a manufacturing industry only. A laundry
is not such."' 15
Actually there have been many cases in which the supreme court has
applied the industrial plant concept in a much broader sense. For example, in
Land Title Bank and Trust Company v. Stout,16 the court, in considering
the application of the assembled plant rule to a five-story apartment building
in which elevators had been installed, held as follows:
Thus, in the case of manufacturing plants we have pointed out that
it is the machinery and equipment which convert the four walls of
the factory building into a valuable industrial property. If these
were to be taken away, little would remain of the mortgagee's
security.
The rule has been applied not only to manufacturing establish-
ments, but to other industrial operations such as coal mines . . .
stone quarries ... a street railway....
In a case closely analogous to the one now before us, Medical
Tower Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 104 F.2d 133, the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that elevators in an office
building must be considered part of the freehold ...
It seems clear to us that the mortgage now held by the plaintiff
14. United Laundries, Inc. v. Board of Assessment, 359 Pa. 195, 58 A.2d 833
(1948); North Side Laundry Co. v. Allegheny County Board of Property Assessment,
366 Pa. 636, 79 A.2d 419 (1951).
15. 161 Pa. Super. 412, 416, 54 A.2d 912, 914 (1947) [rev. 359 Pa. 195, 58 A.2d
833 (1948)].
16. 339 Pa. 302, 14 A.2d 282 (1940).
1961)
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trustee was intended to encumber the apartment house as an operat-
ing establishment, .... Not only is this established by the express
language of the mortgage itself, but the court below has found that
'the four elevators installed by petitioner are an integral and essen-
tial part of the operating plant of Cliveden Hall as an apartment
building' . . . With this conclusion we are in complete accord. 17
(Emphasis added.)
In Penn-Lehigh Corporation Appeal,'8 the owner of a building, adapt-
able as a "light industrial manufactory" but containing bowling lanes, con-
tended that the lanes could not be taxed as realty under the Fourth to
Eighth Class County Assessment Law as amended in 1953, effective in
1956. Counsel for both sides had stipulated that the county had not assessed
the property under the assembled industrial doctrine and in this case the
court remarked that the assessment could not have been sustained under
that doctrine, "because a bowling lane could not be considered to be an
industrial plant." However, on the finding of the lower court that there was
no physical attachment of the alleys to the building and that they could be
removed without any physical damage to the alleys themselves or to the
building in which they were located, the superior court held that the lanes
were personal property and not taxable as realty, without any debate as to
the status of the property as an "industrial establishment" under the exemp-
tive provisions of 1953.19
Although dicta in the North Side Laundry Case, supra, indicated that
the court would not consider a hotel an "industrial plant," the court in its
opinion in that case thrust the meaning of the term into orbit with the remark
that it could "do no better than to define an industrial plant as that type of
establishment which the ordinary man thinks of as such."' 20 As a general
statement of what the term "industrial plant" includes, this may be of some
use to those called upon for advice or decisions insofar as they may be
dealing with business activities which clearly fall within these words. How-
ever, "industrial plant" and "industrial establishment" are, as the cases show,
flexible terms and the "ordinary man" test furnishes no practical guidance
for ascertaining their periphery and for determining the status of cases in
this area. The answer in any questioned case would depend upon the spe-
cialized knowledge of the "ordinary man" to whom the question was put,
and whether he has been exposed to court decisions that have been made in
other cases regarding the use of the term, not to mention his attitude regard-
17. 339 Pa. 302, 307, 14 A.2d 282, 284 (1940).
18. 191 Pa. Super. 649, 159 A.2d 56 (1960).
19. Ibid.
20. 366 Pa, 636, 640, 79 A.2d 419, 421 (1951). Hotels, it may be remarked, have
claimed exemption from sales and use taxes on their purchases on the ground that they
must charge tax on occupancy of their rooms. Laundries have made the same claim
since the rendition of laundry service was made taxable in 1959.
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ing the financial consequences of his answer. As Judge Guffey for the lower
court and Judge Woodside for the superior court stated in commenting upon
the opinion of the "ordinary man" on this subject: "It would seem that the
ordinary man would think of a newspaper as an industrial plant, especially
if one were to tell him that a laundry or a carpet cleaning company are such
for the purpose here being considered." '21 (Emphasis added.)
We will leave the reader to complete this phase of the subject by re-
ferring to his own dictionary, volumes of "Words and Phrases," and ex-
periences for the meaning of "industry," "plant" and "establishment." Let
him then decide whether he knows where to draw the lines, if such lines shall
be drawn, around "industrial establishments," "business establishments,"
and "commercial establishments." Does he know of any business premises
the owner of which cannot claim entitlement to this exemption and at least
create controversies which it would take years to settle-unless the bedevilled
tax officials eliminate these controversies by interpreting "industrial establish-
ment" to please all industrial owners, that is to exempt all places of busi-
ness ?22
In conclusion, the moral for statute draftsmen considering the extension
of exemptions to classes larger than those presently circumscribed and
defined by judicial precedents might be: Terms such as "industrial opera-
tions," "industrial processing" or "industrial services," without specific
administrable limitations, may result in the enactment of a "tax-nothing
law" in the area of business activities, not to mention the chaos they create
in tax observance and enforcement.
21. Messenger Publishing Co. v. Allegheny County Board of Property Assess-
ment, 183 Pa. Super. 407, 409, 132 A.2d 768, 769 (1957). The "ordinary" man's con-
clusions would also depend (or at least in the 1940's would have depended) on whether
he was acting under instructions from the Superior Court or the Supreme Court. In
Golle v. Charleroi Saving and Trust Co., 20 Wash. County 169 (Pa. 1940), the rule was
applied to a theater where the fans, lights, curtains, projectors, etc. were held part of the
real estate under the assembled plant doctrine.
22. In some localities, no attempts apparently have been made to draw such lines
and no reference materials seem to be in use except books on valuations which fail to
observe any distinction between industrial and commercial establishments, but rather
lump all property into two classes: (1) Residential, and (2) Commercial (the latter
being considered synonymous with "industrial").
Property is assessable at fair market value under the law. However, it
is probably fair to say that very few countries fix assessments at 100% of
market value, but the percentage of market value represented by assessments
varies widely throughout the State. The State Tax Equalization Board has
made studies of the relation between assessments and market values on a county-
wide basis which statistics show wide variances among the counties. Such
statistics are based on sales of real estate generally and no attempt is made to
classify separately residential, commercial and industrial properties or to distin-
guish between urban, suburban and rural districts within the county. Rosenbluth,




The second question, or set of questions, presented under the 1953
amendments relate to the exemptive phrase "machinery and equipment con-
tained in" the establishment. Did the legislature, by this language, relieve
from realty taxes not only loose and removable items (formerly taxed as realty
only by application of the assembled industrial plant doctrine2 3), or does this
provision also remove from realty taxes things that are so affixed or constructed
as not to be removable from the business premises in any practical sense?
Does this provision mean that building improvements such as elevators,
plumbing fixtures, and heating and air-conditioning equipment shall be
excluded in determining the tax on industrial establishments? Does it
prohibit the taxation of structures, other than buildings, used in industrial
establishments ?24
If one undertook to answer these questions according to the rules
generally applied by the Pennsylvania courts (where the assembled plant
doctrine has not been invoked) for the purpose of distinguishing those
things which become realty from those which remain personal property, the
determinations would be made as follows:
23. This principle was stated in Pennsylvania in Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W. & S.
at 119: "Whether fast or loose, therefore, all the machinery of a manufactory which is
necessary to constitute it, and without which it would not be a manufactory at all, must
pass as part of the freehold." This rule was more recently expressed in Titus v. Poland
Coal Co., 275 Pa. 431, 119 Atl. 540 (1923) to the effect that a chattel placed in an
industrial establishment for permanent use, and necessary to the operation of the plant
becomes a fixture, and as such a part of the real estate although not physically attached
thereto; in other words, if the article whether fast or loose, be indispensable in carrying
an the specific business, it becomes a part of the realty. See also First National Bank
of Mt. Carmel v. Reichmeder, 371 Pa. 463, 469, 91 A.2d 277, 279 (1952) in which
it is stated to the same effect: "all essential parts of an industrial plant are to be re-
garded as real estate . . . passing to the mortgagee of the realty even though not
specifically mentioned in the descriptive clause of the mortgage ... "
24. Perhaps the full significance of this provision can best be explained by listing
at this point some general designations of the industrial property involved:
1. Land. 6. Things which although installed
2. The "shells" of buildings, i.e., the and more or less securely at-
foundation, floor, walls and roof. tached for operational use could,
3. Building fixtures, such as space practically speaking, be removed
heating and air-conditioning equip- without material injury to them
ment, elevators, escalators, and or the remaining realty.
plumbing and lighting equip- 7. Things installed upon the prem-
ment, etc. ises with little or no attachment
4. Structures other than buildings, thereto and, if necessary, mov-
including bins, bridges, grain able; e.g., lathes and drill presses.
elevators, fences, furnaces, ovens, 8. Appliances, furniture, tools and
silos, stacks, tanks, towers, etc. similar loose or portable items
5. Business equipment installed and used in the establishment.
affixed to the premises so as not
to be removable in any practical
sense of the term.
Except for the structures mentioned in item 4, no attempt is made to describe specific
types of materials or equipment going to make up industrial establishments ranging
from laundries to steel plants, etc.
[Vol. 65
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(1) If the property is loose-like desks, plug-in or ready hook-up
appliances, or tools-it is personal property.
(2) If the property is a building or structure, or if it is something
that is "so annexed that it cannot be removed without destruction or material
injury to the thing itself or to the remaining realty, it is realty even in the
face of an expressed intention that it should be considered personalty. '25
(3) If, although connected to the realty it remains identifiable, and
is removable without destroying or materially injuring it or the remaining
realty, it may be considered "part of the realty or remain personalty depend-
ing upon the intention of the parties at the time of the annexation; in this
class fall such chattels as boilers and machinery affixed for the use of an
owner or tenant but readily removable.
''26
These are rules which the courts have applied where the issue of realty
versus personalty has been resolved without invoking the assembled plant
doctrine, or some equivalent rule which practically dispenses with all tests
25. Clayton v. Lienhard, 312 Pa. 433, 436, 167 Atd. 321, 322 (1933).
26. Id. at 437, 167 Atl. at 322. For the evolution of the law on this subject and
tests of annexation, adaptation, and intention which the courts have applied, see Kratovil,
Fixtures and the Real Estate Mortgagee, 97 U. PA. L. RF.v. 181-6 (1948):
The fact of physical annexation to the land furnishes such an obvious and
understandable link with the realty that courts have clung with great tenacity
to the annexation requirement. Even in early times, however, the rule was not
without its exceptions. As long ago as 1522 it was held that if a man has a
mill and the miller takes the millstone out of the mill in order to make it grind
the better, although it is actually severed from the mill yet it remains parcel
thereof as if it had always been lying upon the other stone, and accordingly
it will pass by a lease or conveyance of the mill . . . in a landmark decision
(Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W. & S. 116 (Pa. 1841)) it was held that detachable
rolls in a rolling mill passed to a real estate mortgagee with the land . . .
Despite occasional setbacks (Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853)), this view
had obtained a clear ascendancy before the turn of the century and is now all
but hornbook. In an overwhelming majority of the modern decisions, machinery
indispensable to the functioning of an industrial plant is deemed a fixture passing
to the real estate mortgagee. Where the adaptation factor characteristic of the
industrial case is strong, courts dispense with the annexation requirement al-
together . . . However, some courts seem reluctant to allow further encroach-
ments on the annexation test . . . as a result of the New York decisions, it is
a universal practice in that state to include a chattel mortgage clause in each
real estate mortgage, which of itself is proof that the decisions fail to meet
the community's needs. A significant development of modern times is the posi-
tion of pre-eminence achieved by the intention test. Indeed, adaptation and mode
of annexation are now frequently regarded as not separate tests at all, but as
circumstances throwing light on the question of intention. . . It has often
been said that intention, as the word is used in decisions employing the intention
test, is not the secret intention of the annexor. The test is an objective one, and
intention is determined from the nature of the article, relation of the parties,
adaptation, mode of annexation and all the surrounding circumstances. This
exclusion of secret intent, it is plain, is intended primarily for the benefit of
third parties . . . in view of the confusion in the cases as to what articles are
to be deemed fixtures, for the mortgagee to place reliance on the mortgage
alone as covering all necessary articles installed in the building is to run a very
real and wholly unnecessary risk. (Emphasis added.)
For the divergence of Ohio and Pennsylvania cases with respect to the test of adap-
tation to business purposes, see note 46, infra.
1961]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
other than adaptation and treats as industrial real estate everything placed
thereon whether fast or loose. [If one were to ask the "ordinary man" what
he thinks is meant by "machinery" and "equipment," his answers probably
would approximate those reached under these general rules, especially if
(as the supreme court suggested) one were to tell him how those tests have
been used in other cases.]
Those presumably are the rules that were applied in the case of United
Laundries v. Board of Property Assessment,27 where the superior court
stated:
The appellant's position is that the assessment (lot $9,800; building
$40,000; machinery and equipment $52,240) is sustainable under
the phrase 'all other real estate' because of the so-called 'assembled
industrial plant doctrine' . . . in other words, the appellant contends
that the character of the machinery in question is changed, for tax
assessment purposes, from personal property to real estate; for
obviously if it remains personal property it is not subject to real
estate assessment.
28
The superior court then held that the "judgment of the court of common
pleas was correct" in deleting the 52,240 dollars worth of machinery from
the 102,040 dollars assessment because it was personal property, and dis-
missed the appeal of the county tax agency. (On appeal, the supreme court
ruled that the "assembled plant doctrine" applied and everything was taxable
as realty. 29 )
27. 161 Pa. Super. 412, 54 A.2d 912 (1947).
28. Id. at 414, 54 A.2d at 912. These rules or classes are set forth in Clayton v.
Lienhard, 312 Pa. 433, 167 Atl. 321 (1933) (mechanics lien on garage prevailed over
bailment lease of sprinkler system because it could not be removed without material
injury to the building); and Penn-Lehigh Corporation Appeal, 191 Pa. Super. 649,
159 A.2d 56 (1960) (bowling lanes held not subject to realty tax because removable and
parties treated them as personal property). The industrial plant doctrine seems to have
"had little vitality where the security device (competing with the realty mortgage) was
a bailment lease... The reason . . . may be due to the peculiar favored status of that
form of security device in Pennsylvania-there would seem to be nothing else which
would justify different treatment for bailment leases": Robinson, McGough, and
Schienholtz, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Pennsylvania Industrial
Plant Doctrine, 16 U. PITT. L. Rv. 261 (1955). The U.C.C. has no effect upon
the question considered herein. See also American Laundry Machine Co. v. Miners
Trust Co., 307 Pa. 395, 161 Atl. 306 (1932); Royal Store Fixture v. Patton, 183
Pa. Super. 249, 130 A.2d 271 (1957); and the dissent of the two justices in United
Laundries v. Board of Property Assessment, 359 Pa. 195, 202, 58 A.2d 833, 836
(1948) : "I would affirm the unanimous decision of the Superior Court in the opinion
by Judge Arnold. . . The machinery and equipment of a commercial laundry and
of a carpet cleaning company, not affixed to the land, were taxed as part of the real
estate. . . . This machinery and equipment, which is personal property, did not form
part of [the realty]. .. .
29. "Thus . . . we have pointed out that it is the machinery and equipment which
convert the four walls of the factory building into a valuable industrial property. If
these were to be taken away, little would remain of the mortgagee's security." Land
Title Bank and Trust Company v. Stoudt, 339 Pa. 302, 307, 14 A.2d 282, 284 (1940).
See also notes 8 and 22. Apparently no statistics have been compiled on the dollar
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However, an entirely different approach to the 1953 amendments is
taken by claimants for exemption who contend that the terms machinery and
equipment must be interpreted to relieve from realty taxation things installed
in an industrial establishment regardless of their removability or character
as personal property or real property. Their concept of the exemptive provi-
sion is that it excludes from tax not only machinery and equipment which
is personal property (and which formerly was taxed as realty only by applica-
tion of the assembled plant doctrine), but also equipment which has become
realty, and structures other than buildings used in industrial operations.
Literally applied, this would mean that in the field of industrial property
there is very little that can be considered taxable under the 1953 provisions
except the empty shells of buildings and the land upon which they stand. The
proponents of this theory rely upon the case of Gulf Oil Corporation v. City
of Philadelphia.3"
The question in the Gulf case was "whether or not certain tanks of ap-
pellant's oil refinery used in the course of its refining operations are within
the provisions of the Act of June 3, 1915, P.L. 787 which exempts from taxa-
tion 'machinery . . . used in manufacturing'. '3 1 The debate in this case
centered around the functional question whether the tanks were merely
storage receptacles or whether sufficient processes occurred within the tanks
to qualify them as "machinery." There was evidence that certain processes
did occur within the tanks, and since the refining of oil products is consid-
ered to be a "manufacturing" operation, the court ruled that the tanks fell
within the phrase "machinery used in manufacturing." The court did not
seem to be concerned with the manner in which the tanks were installed and
no mention was made of their removability. However, in holding that they
were exempt "machinery" the court stated:
There is an analogy between the problem before us and the problem
whether a certain machine is a part of the freehold. The criterion of
physical attachment has long been rejected in the solution of that
problem. Chief Justice Gibson in Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W. & S.
116, 37 Am. Dec. 490, said in 1841 that in 'the old criterion' of
amounts or ratios of exempt machinery and equipment in relation to other property.
Because of variations throughout the state between assessed valuations and actual market
values, it would be difficult to paint a composite state picture in dollar amounts. How-
ever, it would be interesting and informative to see figures on local dollar amounts in
these categories.
30. 357 Pa. 101, 53 A.2d 250 (1947).
31. Id. at 102, 53 A.2d at 250. The act in question reads as follows: "In cities of
the first class, the assessment of real estate for taxation, the machinery and tools used
in manufacturing in any mill or manufactory shall not be considered or included in
determining the value of real estate .. " PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 15976 (1915).
See also note 8 for the exemption of machinery in the City of Pittsburgh. Note
that the 1953 exemption applicable to the other taxing districts of the Commonwealth




'physical attachment' which 'was adapted to fixtures and dwellings
before England had become a manufacturing country' there was
'want of adaptation to the business and improvements of the age'
and that the true test was whether the machinery 'was palpably an
integrant part of a manufactory or a mill', i.e. 'was necessary to
constitute it and without which it would not be a manufactory at all'.
See also Defense Plant Corporation Tax Assessment Case, 350 Pa.
520, 39 A. 2d 713 .... 32
What "analogy" did the court find between the Voorhis case and the
Defense Plant case, and the issue before it in the Gulf case? The Voarhis
and Defense Plant cases both involved the application of the "assembled plant
doctrine," the first for purposes of a plant mortgage, the second for tax pur-
poses. Any inference that because certain industrial personal property was
treated as if it were realty under the "assembled plant doctrine," property
which clearly is realty should be considered personal property in the absence
of the assembled plant doctrine, would be a non sequitur. It is true, of course,
that the assembled plant cases avoid any test of removability, since the rule on
which they rest dispenses with any test of annexation in holding everything
in the plant to be realty. If for tax purposes, the Act of 1915 3 had defined
"personal property" to include certain items of industrial realty, there would
have been an analogy between such a fictional rule and the assembled plant
doctrine, viz., disregard of the annexation-removability test. This was not
done, however. Nor does the opinion in the Gulf case state whether the tanks
in question were considered personalty or realty. It is not clear from the
opinion, therefore, what the court had in mind in the statement quoted above.
The phase of the Gulf case principally relied upon for the theory that
an exemption of "machinery" includes items of real estate as well as person-
alty appears in dicta in the court's opinion. The court stated:
Much of the machinery today has only passive or motionless func-
tions to perform in manufacturing. For example, in the manufactur-
ing of metal from iron ore, the blast furnace in which smelting takes
place is composed of a fire brick lining encased in a steel shell. The
ore is reduced to iron by chemical reaction in which certain gasses
permeate the molten iron. This chemical reaction is a process and
is expressed in a chemical formula . . . The blast furnace in which
this process takes place is clearly a part of the machinery of iron
manufacture.
It is as logical to hold that the storage tanks in which take place
physical and chemical processes 2 necessary to the refining of oil, are
machinery as it is to hold that the smelters used in making metal are
machinery.3
4
32. Id. at 108, 53 A.2d at 253.
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 15976 (1915).
34. 357 Pa. 101, 109, 53 A.2d 250, 254 (1947).
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[Court footnote 2: "The court below found an analogy between the
tanks in question and a silo, the implication being that a silo is no
part of the machinery of a manufactory and, therefore, tanks are
not .... the silo used in fodder making is just as much a part of the
machinery of silage making as milk pans and churns are a part of the
machinery of butter making".]
From this it is argued that since blast furnaces and silos are large structures
which anyone who has seen them would consider real estate, the case stands
for the proposition that the exemption of "machinery" covers real estate as
well as chattels; in other words, that the only question implied in the word
"machinery" is a functional question-the contributory role which property
must play in industrial operations to qualify as "machinery." Since the Acts
of 195335 exempt "equipment" as well as "machinery," and do not specify
that it be "industrial" in use but only that it be "contained in" any industrial
establishment, it is argued that not even a functional test is involved in the
word "equipment." In short, that everything, including structures, is "equip-
ment," execpt perhaps the walls and roof of a building.
36
The theory of the Gulf case, although not fully explained is interestingly
sidelighted in another opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, written
three years later, which suggests that the result in the Gulf case was reached
on the theory that the tanks in that case were personal property. This was
a zoning case, Humphreys v. Stuart Realty Corporation,37 in which the question
was whether certain oil storage tanks, which were "either laid in shallow pits
surrounded by a dirt embankment or . . . entirely covered by 2 or 3 feet of
earth . . . not attached to any foundation or supports" were "structures"
within the meaning of the zoning ordinance. In holding that they were "no
more structures . . . than would be cans, casks, vats, tuns or other types of
containers," the court referred to the decision in the Gulf case, stating:
While a term used in one statute may not call for the same construc-
tion as the same term in another, it is at least of interest in this con-
nection to note that storage tanks--unless perhaps attached to con-
crete foundations or otherwise bolted into the ground-are almost
invariably held in cases involving tax statutes to constitute nothing
more than part of the apparatus and equipment of the business; if
installed merely for the benefit of the industry conducted on the
premises and of no particular benefit to the land if the industry were
removed they are regarded as personal property in the nature of
appliances or machinery. Gulf Oil Corporation v. City of Philadel-
phia, 357 Pa. 101. .3..38 (Emphasis added.)
35. See statutes cited note 6, supra.
36. See also note 58, infra, for the argument that even these are exempt equipment.
37. 364 Pa. 616, 73 A.2d 407 (1950).
38. Id. at 622, 73 A.2d at 410.
In the Humphreys case the court distinguished the facts before it from a New Jersey
case where it appeared that the tanks were set in concrete bases, firmly affixed or
19611
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Clearly this view of the case differentiates between machinery and equip-
ment on one hand, and on the other, structures. It also indicates that in de-
termining whether something is realty or personalty, in the absence of the
assembled plant doctrine, removability is one of the facts to be considered.
In this respect, the theory of the case is consistent with certain Ohio tax
cases. Thus, in Zangerle v. Republic Steel Corporation,"m and Roseville
Pottery, Inc. v. County Board of Revision of Muskingum County,40 where
the question was whether certain items in manufacturing plants were im-
anchored to the ground and with auxiliary piping likewise rigidly fixed upon or under
the ground [so] it might well be that they should be viewed as partaking of the status
of realty. Id. at 621, 73 A.2d at 410.
The court also cited Foley v. Pittsburgh-Demoines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 518
(1949) (which cites the Ohio "machinery cases," see notes 39 and 40, in!ra) for the
statement that: "if installed merely for the benefit of the industry . . . and of no particu-
lar benefit to the land if the industry were removed they (tanks) are regarded as
personal property. . . ." The treatment of adaptation to the particular business as a
reason for not regarding equipment to be part of the real estate seems to be peculiar to
the Ohio cases. See note 47, infra.
39. 144 Ohio St. 529, 60 N.E.2d 170 (1945). In this case the court stated:
The items in question involve machinery and equipment of various sizes and
various weights ranging from 750 pounds to almost 950 tons . . . practically all
the machines are especially designed to produce the products of the mill and are
not adaptable for any other purpose. . . Some of the items are not attached to
anything but simply rest on the floor. Some are not attached but are supported
by members of a building-for instance, cranes. Some of the items are attached
to other pieces of equipment which they serve. All the items that are attached,
except certain ones (such as wiring), are bolted for the purpose of keeping them
in place and preventing vibration incident to their operation . . . all machines
and motors are assembled at the manufacturer's plant and if they are not too
large to meet shipping requirements they are shipped assembled as units to the
corporation's plant. Others are disassembled sufficiently for shipping purposes
and then reassembled at the corporation's plant. The parts of a machine that
have to be disassembled are bolted together by bolts with removable nuts. All
items that are attached, together with the bed plates, are removable without
injury to the items or to the building. Most of the items are equipped with lugs
so that after the nuts are unscrewed from the bolts they may be more easily
lifted from the bolts and removed. When a plant is dismantled the bolts remain
in the building. Items similar to those here involved have often been removed
and sold. Some of the items in dispute have since been removed from the taxing
district. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at -, 60 N.E.2d at 172. Three justices dissented. They would have reversed the
Board of Tax Appeals and held the subject items to be realty.
40.. 149 Ohio St. 89, 77 N.E.2d 608 (1948). The court stated:
"The tunnel kiln belonging to Roseville is about 245 feet long, about 10 feet
wide and about 10 feet high. The six tunnel kilns belonging to Mosaic are
from 265 feet to 340 feet long, about 11 feet wide and 7 feet high. . . All the
kilns were designed by engineers for specific ceramic manufacture and can-
not be used in other industries or for the manufacture of different ceramic
ware unless changed entirely in design. They can be knocked down and moved
to other locations and the records recite several instances where similar kilns
have been so handled. Trade papers advertise kilns of this sort for a sale and
removal. The tracks in the kiln can be removed, although the cement slab,
left after moving a kiln, is demolished by the removal of the tracks ..
(Emhasis added.)
Id. at -, 77 N.E.2d at 610. Two justices dissented. They would have reversed the
Board of Tax Appeals and held the subject items to be realty.
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provements on land and taxable at one hundred per cent of their value or
personal property and taxable at fifty per cent of their value the court con-
sidered whether the items (machines in the first case and kilns in the latter)
were removable. It having been found from the evidence that they were re-
movable, the court in both cases affirmed the decisions that the items were
taxable as personal property rather than realty.
Will the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania hold that the 1953 exemption
of "machinery and equipment contained in any industrial establishment"
exempts from tax that which is real estate under all realistic concepts as
well as personal items only considered realty under the assembled plant rule?
As a question of statutory interpretation, the answer appears doubtful in view
of the rule that exemptive provisions shall be narrowly construed. 41 How-
ever, there is a more potent reason for a restrictive interpretation of the
exemption, and this may have had something to do with the oblique treatment
of the question in the Gulf case. This is the rule that the legislature cannot
constitutionally set up its own classes of real estate for exemption from tax.
This rule is the result of article IX, section 2 of the Constitution of Pennsyl-
vania which prohibits the exemption of property other than that enumerated
in article IX, section 1, which provides, in part:
[The] general assembly may, by general laws, exempt from tax-
ation public property used for public purposes, actual places of reli-
gious worship, places of burial not used or held for private or
corporate profit, institutions of purely public charity, and real and
personal property owned, occupied, and used by any branch, post,
or camp of honorably discharged soldiers, sailors, and marines ...
Article IX, section 2, which actually operates only as a restriction with re-
gard to real property, provides: "All laws exempting property from taxation,
other than the property above enumerated, shall be void." Thus, once real
property is selected as the subject of a property tax, none may be exempted
therefrom unless it is the kind of property enumerated in article IX, sec-
tion 1.42
41. Provisions exempting persons and property from taxation shall be strictly
construed: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 558 (1937) (Uniform Statutory Construction Act).
"It is well settled that where the taxpayer or his property is within the general lan-
guage of the statute imposing the tax, all provisions relied upon to establish an exemp-
tion from the tax are to be strictly construed against the claim for exemption": Com-
monwealth v. McCarthy, 332 Pa. 465, 468, 3 A.2d 267, 269 (1938). "The approach
to the solution of this question should be made in the light of the well-known principle
that language which provides exemptions from the general imposition of a tax must be
strictly construed": Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company v. Hines, 337 Pa. 48, 53,
10 A.2d 553, 555 (1940). Christley v. Butler County, 37 Pa. Super. 32 (1908).
42. See Commonwealth v. Dauphin County, 335 Pa. 177, 6 A.2d 870 (1939) ; Clear-
field Bituminous Coal Corp. v. Thomas, 336 Pa. 572, 9 A.2d 727 (1939) ; Ogontz
School Tax Exemption Case, 361 Pa. 284, 65 A.2d 150 (1949) ; Hill School Tax Ex-




Although there is no fixed minimum class insofar as the taxation and
exemption of personal property are concerned, and although real estate may
be classified for purposes of applying different tax rates, realty may not be
subclassified for exemption purposes.43 From this it would follow that any
interpretation of the exemptive terms "machinery" or "equipment" to include
real estate should be rejected in favor of an interpretation which would in-
clude only personal property and, therefore, conform to the constitutional
limitations.
44
Assuming that the words "machinery and equipment" are construed to
encompass only those things which are personal property, how broadly are
the test rules to be applied in holding certain things to be personal property
rather than real estate? As to buildings and other structures, it would seem
that any realistic application of the tests mentioned herein would rule out
their exemption on the theory that they are personal property. However, if
the annexation-removability test were construed to permit everything to be
treated as personal property that conceivably could be removed from the
premises, the end result would be nearly the same as construing "machinery
and equipment" to include realty. As Chief Justice Gibson said in the land-
mark case of Voorhis v. Freeman:
45
It would be difficult to point out any sort of machinery, however
complex in its structure, or by what means soever held in its place,
which might not with care and caution be taken to pieces and re-
The classification of real estate for the purpose of applying different tax rates is
permissible: Jermyn v. Scranton, 212 Pa. 598, 62 AtI. 29 (1905). See also Moore v.
Pittsburgh School District, 338 Pa. 466, 13 A.2d 29 (1940), holding it immaterial that
a different rate might apply to property of the same class, located however, in different
taxing districts, and Poor District case (No. 1), 329 Pa. 390, 197 At. 334 (1938).
In regard to property of public utilities, see State Tax Equalization Bd. of Pa., Tax
Exempt Real Property: 1957 County Assessed Valuations at 42 wherein it is stated:
"It is is interesting to note that neither Constitutional nor statutory provisions exempt
real property of public utilities from local taxes. The traditional practice of exempting
public utility property from local taxes in Pennsylvania dates back to an early decision
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1825. Pennsylvania is the only state which
exempts real property of public utilities from local taxation."
43. See Newhouse, Constitutional Uniformity and Equality in State Taxation,
MicH. LEGAL STUDIEs 465-471 (1959), and an article by Carchi Constitutional
Limitations on The Exemption of Real Property, 11 OHIO ST. L.J. 153 (1950).
44. Where a reasonable interpretation can be adopted which will save the consti-
tutionality of a statute, resolution or ordinance, it is the court's duty to adopt it:
Allentown School District Mercantile Tax Case, 370 Pa. 161, 87 A.2d 4 (1952); Coe
et al. v. Duffield, 185 Pa. Super. 532, 138 A.2d 303 (1958).
Of course, someone is bound to contend that no constitutional question would be
presented if the legislature defined as "personal property" that which it desires to
exempt. Assuming that the legislature may exclude from realty taxes any machinery
and equipment which is personal in nature, exempting that which is "real estate" under
all realistic concepts and established principles of law is another matter. The Legis-
lature can write artificial definitions of words for purely legislative purposes, but when
the question is whether constitutional requirements have been met, realities rather than
fictions must be considered.
45. 2 W. & S. 116 (Pa. 1841).
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moved in the same way, and the greater or less facility with which
it could be done would be too vague a thing to serve for a test. It
would allow the stones, hoppers, bolts, meal-chests, screens, scales,
weights, elevators, hopper-boys, and running gears of a grist mill, as
well as the hammers and bellows of a forge, and parts of many other
buildings erected for manufactories, to be put into the class of per-
sonal property when it would be palpably absurd to consider them
as such... The rule of physical annexation would . . . produce the
most absurd consequences by stripping houses of their window-shut-
ters and doors and farms of the houses themselves. . .. 46 [More
than a quarter of a century before adoption of the constitutional
provisions above mentioned.]
It was for this very reason that our courts resorted to the adaptation
test and established the assembled industrial plant doctrine. If the broad
claims made for tax exemption under the 1953 amendments were granted,
it would represent the adoption of what might be termed a "Disassembled
Industrial Plant Doctrine for Tax Purposes: Whether loose or fast, if it is
adapted to the particular operations conducted in the establishment, and if
it can be disconnected or taken apart and hauled away, it is personal prop-
erty." Decisions in Ohio have moved in this direction, although not with
the result of totally exempting machinery from taxation.47 In Pennsylvania,
46. Id. at 118.
47. It should be noted that Ohio's law on fixtures has followed a different course
from that established in Pennsylvania. Commencing with Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St.
511 (1853) where manufacturing machinery in a woolen mill connected only by belts
and straps with the motive power was held not part of the real estate, Ohio seems to
have regarded the adaption of machinery to the purposes of a particular business as a
reason for treating it as personalty. (This is the exact opposite of the way the adap-
tation test has been applied in Pennsylvania.) On the other hand, if the equipment
relates to the building or the premises generally and is not limited to a particular
business, the Ohio courts have treated it as realty. Thus, in Case Mfg. Co. v. Garven,
45 Ohio St. 289, 13 N.E. 493 (1887) machinery supplying the motive power to opera-
tional machinery was held part of the realty although removable without material injury.
However, steam boiler equipment firmly affixed to the land was held personal property
where it was specially constructed to produce steam for the particular business and not
usable to produce power for other businesses. See also Zangerle v. Standard Oil Co.
of Ohio, 144 Ohio St. 506, 60 N.E.2d 52 (1945). Contrast this with the Pennsylvania
cases cited in note 23, supra (assembled plant doctrine) and note 28 (where the
assembled plant doctrine was not applied). See also note 26, 5 Powell, Real Property,
§ 660 (1949), and Holden, Classification of Property, 11 Omo ST. L.J. 153 (1950).
In First National Bank of Mt. Carmel v. Reichder, 371 Pa. 463, 467, 91 A.2d 277,
278 (1952) the supreme court stated:
A fixture in a manufactory, mill or colliery may have no adaptation to
many other kinds of business. Although not attached, yet, if it be designed for
the convenience of trade on the premises, and be so used, or subject to be called
into use at any time, it becomes a fixture. If the article is indispensible in
carrying on the specific business, it becomes a part of the realty.
It should also be noted that the Ohio tax cases involve the taxation of machinery
and equipment on 50% of its value if it is personal property, as compared with 100%
of the value of realty. Personal property consisting of industrial machinery is also
taxed at a lower rate than other personal property in Ohio. The Constitution of Ohio,
as amended in 1931, permits the sub-classification of personal property.
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however, the courts have not held attached equipment to be personalty merely
because it is removable. Rather, the "removability of items without material
injury to themselves or to the remaining realty" means that they may be
considered "either personalty or realty, depending upon the intention of the
parties at the time of annexation,"-the "parties" usually being the vendor
of equipment sold under a financing agreement authorizing its removal in
the event of default, and the purchaser who owns the premises on which it
is installed.48 Thus, in Penn-Lehigh Corp. Appeal,49 where bowling lanes
were held not taxable as realty, the court observed that bowling lanes may be
sawed into three parts, removed, and put together again elsewhere. This
fact, it was held, brought them within the "third classification" and since the
parties had stated in a financing agreement that title was to be retained by
the seller until full payment had been made, they were treated as personal
property and not subject to realty tax.50
The opinion in the Penn-Lehigh case makes no reference to whether or
not the purchase price of the lanes had been paid prior to the tax period in
question. Apparently this would not have made any difference since the
courts usually have considered the intention of the parties only at the time
of annexation. 5 What logical bearing does such contractual intent have on
whether property should be considered realty or personalty for tax purposes?
If a person engages someone to raze his house at some future date, this does
not make the house a chattel before it has been torn down. Why then should
private agreements regarding the removability of fixtures affect their char-
acter for tax purposes ?52
48. See cases cited in note 27, supra.
49. 191 Pa. Super. 649, 159 A.2d 56 (1960).
50. This raised the question as to whether the use of bowling lanes for games
is taxable as a license to use personal property. In this connection, see Section 2(j) of
the Selective Sales and Use Tax Act: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-2(j) (1956).
Also see Horsham Township v. Horsham Key Bowling, Inc., 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 627
(1958) where bowling lanes were held not taxable by a second class township as an
amusement because the tax was based on the charge for the game rather than on an
admission charge; and Prudential Insurance Co. v. Kaplan, 330 Pa. 33, 198 Atl. 68
(1938) where an agreement between the landlord and the tenant that bowling lanes
installed by the latter might be removed at the end of the term was held to permit their
removal upon foreclosure of a mortgage on the premises.
51. In re Ginsburg, 255 F.2d 358 (3d Cir. 1958). See also Royal Stone Fixture
Co. v. Patten, 183 Pa. Super. 249, 130 A.2d 271 (1958), where the court said:
As a general rule, parties as between themselves, may in their dealings with
chattels annexed to or used in connection with realty, fix on them whatever
character, as realty or personalty, on which they may agree . . . and the law
will enforce such understanding whenever the rights of third parties will not be
prejudiced. Id. at 255, 130 A.2d at 274.
But in United States v. 15.3 Acres of Land in the City of Scranton, 154 F. Supp.
770 (M.D. Pa. 1957), the court held that where an article attached to real estate is so
affixed as to become fairly and substantially a part of the realty, its character as
personal property will not be preserved even by special agreement.
52. In Clayton v. Lienhard, 312 Pa. 443, 167 Atl. 321 (1933) the court remarked:
Contract cannot make a chattel realty, nor realty a chattel . . . In my opinion,
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The legislature recognized, in enacting the Uniform Commercial
Code that rules regulating the rights of parties in their private commer-
cial transactions are subject to qualification where public laws are in issue.
In section 2-401 regarding the passage of title in sales of goods, it is stated
in the Code Comment: "This section, however, in no way intends to indicate
which line of interpretation should be followed in cases where the appli-
cability of 'public' regulation depends upon a 'sale' or upon location of title
without further definition. '53 It is difficult to understand why the court in
the Penn-Lehigh bowling lane case decided the tax question on the subjective
intent expressed in a private agreement. Did the court stop to consider the
practical implications of its ruling on the duties of tax assessors? It might
profitably have referred to an early decision of the superior court recently
cited by a common pleas court: "Obviously, for practical reasons, assessors
could not be required to delve into the strictly private transactions between
parties and try to uncover leasehold or other interests in order to determine
who should be assessed. This was pointed out in Gutherie v. Pittsburgh Dry




On the other hand, it is not difficult to understand why "experts" in the
intricacies of this subject endeavor to reap every advantage which the present
state of the law offers to escape taxes. It is not surprising, for example,
that shopping centers, freezing plants, etc., should contend that before evalu-
ating their premises for realty tax, air conditioning and heating or freezing
equipment must be wholly excluded from consideration. If cases involving
rights of removal under financing agreements and leases are precedents for
what may be considered personal property in tax cases, a "disassembled
plant doctrine" will soon become a reality, for on this theory a case can be
found for "converting" almost anything into personalty. In 339-41 Market
Store Corp. v. Darling Stores,55 the court held that "any chattel such as the
air-conditioning unit, [a 3000 pound unit with ducts from the basement to
the storeroom] not having been made part of the demised premises and be-
ing readily removable therefrom without the destruction of the chattel and
without non-compensable damage to the premises, remains personalty and,
therefore the property of the installing tenant."56 (Emphasis added.) Of
course, what the court really meant was that the tenant, who bought and paid
all fixtures whilst attached to the freehold are, for the time being, a part of the
realty. No contract can change their nature. It is true there may be a contract
allowing someone to take them off ... But a contract that something may
be converted into personalty at a future day, does not make it so from the time
of the contract. Id. at 438, 167 At. at 323.
This rule should be followed in tax cases.
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-401 (1953) (comment).
54. Guerrin v. Pelham Electric Corp., 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 802, 805 (1954).
55. 355 Pa. 312, 49 A.2d 686 (1946).
56. Id. at 318, 49 A.2d at 688.
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for the unit and its installation, was entitled to remove it upon compensat-
ing the landlord for any injury to the realty and, therefore, the court would
theorize that "it remained personalty" as a legal basis for this decision. Can
local tax assessors, even with legal assistance, be expected to cope with
theories as fissionable as these and find a stable basis for taxation?
"Machinery and equipment"-innocent sounding words! Who would
ever have suspected what lay beneath their surface? That they imported
into the field of realty taxation all of the complexities, fictions and confusion
of the law of fixtures: Personalty or realty? Permanently annexed or re-
movable? Removable with or without injury? What was the intention of
the parties? Are there any secret agreements? Adapted to the business or
to the premises? What are the proper tests? Are they valid? How shall
they be applied? (This subject has been described as "the chaos of fixture
law.15 7) These questions confront local government officials responsible for
administration of our realty tax laws.58 Entangled with the ambiguities of
the term "industrial establishment" they place public officials in the position
of a baseball team whose infield has been planted with shrubbery.5 9 Taxes
57. See Kratovil, Fixtures and the Real Estate Mortgagee, supra note 26.
58. Similar questions are presented under the Selective Sales and Use Tax Act,
which exempts a manufacturer's, farmer's, public utility's, etc. (see note 1, supra.)
purchase of property to be used directly in operations. Although the exemptive pro-
visions state that they do not cover the purchase of equipment and supplies "to be used
in the construction of real estate," the words "other than machinery and equipment, or
parts or foundations therefor that may be affixed to such real estate" immediately follow
this provision, as an exception to the real estate exception. This, it is contended, opens
the exemptions to almost everything except the walls and roofs of buildings-and
partial exemption is even claimed for these in certain situations. For example, it is
contended that the walls of a building housing heavy operating machinery are part of
the exempt "foundation" of the machinery, and that roof ventilators, louvers, stacks,
etc., are "equipment used directly" in operations.
Further questions have been raised under the sales tax law as to whether these
exemptions may be shifted to a construction contractor so that he may purchase materials
without tax where he proposes to use them in the performance of a construction con-
tract for an exempt enterprise. Alternatively, it is argued that a construction contractor
may use the "resale exemption" in purchasing materials to construct a silo, etc., on the
theory that the construction of the silo is a "sale of personal property, viz., machinery
for silage making." But the opposite theory is argued when repairs are made upon!
machinery and equipment. The sales tax law imposes tax upon the service of repairing
personal property. When repairs are made to any industrial machinery and equipment,
it is contended that the machinery and equipment are real estate, and, hence, that the
repair services are not taxable.
59. See Hancock, Pennsylvania Local Government, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 (1957)
wherein it is stated at 51-2:
In Pennsylvania, as in most other states, local government relies heavily on
the property tax as its main source of revenue. The county administers the
machinery that determines the basis of this tax. In recent years the State has
instituted far-reaching changes in this machinery because of evidence that great
inequality existed throughout the State in the application of this tax. . . Be-
cause state school subsidies to school districts are partially based on assessments,
it was recognized that inequality in assessments produced inequality in financial
support of the school system... In some counties the assessments were as low
as 15% of the market value on land, in other counties it was 55%. Upon closer
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can be neither fairly nor honestly-not to mention effectively-administered
under such vague, subjective and controversial rules. How and why was
this "shrubbery" planted in these tax laws?
CONCLUSION
A comparison of the originally stated objectives of the 1953 amendments
with the claims for exemption which have been asserted and allowed there-
under indicates that few, if any, members of the legislature were apprised
of what, it would seem, must have been known to legal draftsmen of the
provision, viz., that its exemptive effect is much greater than the language
suggests, and that the provision is so laden with doubt and controversy as
to produce, indirectly, even broader tax relief through uncertain and
weakened enforcement. The achievement of tax exemption by obfuscation
is not new; this technique has been employed for some time in sales and use
taxes to the detriment of expected revenues, orderly and fair enforcement,
and intelligible judicial review. In one state it has led to the observation
that:
[C]ourts have been entangled for years in an effort to apply a statute
which seems more vague and indefinite with each interpretation, [and
in another that the] statutory language granting the exemptions was
conceived over a substantial period of time, and is based upon such
incongruous premises that the courts . . . have been plagued with ...
cases asking for clarification of the exemption .... (o
It is no credit to our learned profession that this technique has crept into
Pennsylvania. It is particularly lamentable that it should have invaded the
important but neglected and already confused field of local realty taxes.
A better grasp of how the impact of this provision has been obscured
in the local realty tax scene may, perhaps, be reached by reviewing briefly
some general materials on the subject:
The real estate tax is the single most important source of local
government revenues. . . Assessment, which can be defined as
setting a value on a thing for the purpose of taxing it, is the back-
bone of the real and personal property taxes. . . There is no State
agency that has any oversight of the specific assessment procedures
of the counties. If there is no State agency responsible for uni-
formity within the county or city, who then is responsible? The
analysis of the situation in each county it was found that the extremes were
even greater. . . A state-wide committee was provided to recommend the type
of system to be adopted so that uniformity would result. . . By 1955, however,
it was found that only six counties had completed mapping, 9 had established
property record cards, 8 had installed ownership cards and 9 had reassessed.
Consequently, legislation was approved that extended the adoption of these
assessment procedures until January 1, 1958. . ..
60. Brabson, Analysis of Sales and Use Tax Exemptions-With Comments as to
More Uniform Application, 9 VAND. L. R. 294, 311-315 (1956).
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answer is not hard to find. In general and in brief, county or city
commissioners and/or certain of their appointees are responsible
for establishing a uniform system of assessments and for the over-
all operation of the assessment system. . . (Another State agency
should be mentioned if only to dispel any possible misconception
of its function-the State Tax Equalization Board. . . Its con-
cern . . . is not with the assessment function as such, but rather
with a grant-in-aid program of the State. Of course, in the process
of collecting data the Equalization Board may discover some pecu-
liarities of the assessment systems of counties resulting in lack of
uniformity within counties.)
Local assessors, especially if elected, serve many masters. They
must please the electorate. (An informed electorate will be the least
unhappy, in the aggregate, if no favorites are played.) He must please
the tax levying bodies for whom he is making assessments. He
must please the central county assessment office which sets the rules
and regulations under which he must operate. For all of this he
is reimbursed at a per diem rate by the county and, in some in-
stances, by the political subdivision(s) in which he assesses . . .
The minimum qualifications of the elected local assessors are the
ability to garner a plurality of votes and a willingness to subscribe
to the oath pledging diligence in the performance of the assessor's
duties under such rules and regulations as are established accord-
ing to law ...
It is impossible to say that one part of the assessment process is
more important than another. But unless reliable information is
gathered in an orderly way, other parts of the process, no matter
how efficiently run, cannot correct the errors and inequities which
would result from shoddy information gathering.
It should also be noted that:
Each year. . . . organizations concerned with taxes and assess-
ments throughout the Commonwealth are requesting more informa-
tion on exempt property for their various conferences, publications
and legislative proposals .... Inasmuch as tax exempt real property
produces no tax revenue, there has been less attention and concern
paid to exempt assessment records and procedures, generally, as
compared to taxable assessments. In numerous instances, assessing
61. Vanderzell, Assessor's Handbook 1-15 (1959). (This handbook was prepared
and issued by the Bureau of Municipal Affairs, Department of Internal Affairs, Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania, in cooperation with the Municipal Assessors' Association
of Pennsylvania.)
Salaried workers in assessment activities are also poorly paid in relation to the
discretionary nature and difficulty of their duties; a prime example of where cheap
government proves to be the most costly. In many instances county officials have
engaged independent firms of appraisers to make valuations for tax purposes. Where
exclusions or exemptions are asserted, this necessarily involves passing upon what is
taxable and non-taxable. The exercise of such functions presents intriguing questions of
conflict of interests where the same persons are also engaged in private appraisal work
for concerns claiming exemptions and seeking lower valuations under the tax laws.
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policies and procedures for exempt property have been left largely
to the initiative of individual locally-elected assessors . . . As a
result, there has been a widespread lack of uniformity as to policies,
procedures, records, and values, for exempt real property. Numer-
ous exempt properties were not listed at all on the assessment
records of various counties . .. Improvement in exempt property
assessment procedures and records is anticipated as a result of the
various county reassessment programs in process throughout the
Commonwealth .... In some reassessment programs, there are in-
dications that exempt property is not being given the same consider-
ation as taxable real property. Some counties give priority to tax-
able property with the expectation of eventually applying the new
procedures to exempt property at a later date. A number of the
counties, according to present indications, will not complete their
reassessment programs until sometime after 1961 ... This lack of
uniformity in policies and procedures of the various reassessment
programs will tend to complicate future state-wide valuation com-
parisons. 62
The compilation of data from which valuation comparisons can be
made is enormously complicated by the "machinery and equipment" exemp-
tion. Moreover, the ambiguity of the provision has caused such vagueness
in the concept of the exemption that it will be impracticable to isolate and
evaluate its effect under current law and procedures. This is because local
assessors, proceeding generally on the theory that "machinery and equipment"
is regarded as personal property completely eliminate it on this basis from
all valuations, both for tax assessment purposes and for purposes of such
listings and valuations as are made of exempt real estate.
Only in a few areas have valuations been made of machinery and equip-
ment. Consequently, statistical reports of tax exempt real estate in the
Commonwealth do not even purport to show the nature or value of the prop-
erty being eliminated from taxation under this provision, although poten-
tially it probably comprises the largest class of property relieved from realty
taxes.63 And it is realty, not just personal property for which the exemption
62. State Tax Equalization Bd. of Pa., Tax Exempt Real Property: 1957 County
Assessed Valuations 2-10 (1958). It is stated at 7:
"The assessment laws for the various counties vary as to the letter of the law
whether values shall be determined for exempt real property."
63. The -latest state-wide report of tax exempt real estate lists 13 categories, com-
prising "19% of the combined total exempt and taxable assessments of approximately
$15.3 billion." "Machinery and equipment" is not one of these, and the effect of this ex-
emption is not being accounted for anywhere. It is interesting to note that of the exempt
assessments for 1957, "four ownership groups accounted for over half of the state-total
exempt assessments: school districts (15%), municipal governments (14%), religious
organizations (14%), and public utilities (12%)." These figures are, of course, under-
statements because of the previously mentioned sketchy reporting of exempt realty: Id.
at 9.
What valuations would the "machinery and equipment" exemption show, assuming
figures were available? It is the writer's own estimate that it would be between 30%
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progressively is being claimed and allowed under this provision! In an
opinion filed November 29, 1960, a common pleas court held that the
"machinery and equipment" exemption excludes from local realty taxes that
which is real estate, i.e. things constructed and so affixed as not to be remov-
able in any practical sense of the term. Moreover, the court held that quali-
fication for tax relief does not require showing that the property in question
actually is being used in the industrial activity. 64 From this it can be argued
that there is indeed no functional test for obtaining the exemption (the court
called it "exclusion") and that such things as air-conditioning, heating and
plumbing equipment must be eliminated in assessing all industrial establish-
ments. In note 24 of this article, the writer has listed eight categories of
property, all of which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania regarded as tax-
able real estate prior to the 1953 amendments. If the removability and intent
tests stated in Clayton v. Leinhard6 5 were applied, the first five and part
of the sixth would be taxable. If the rule sought by exemption claimants
and evidently upheld in the recent case applies, only the first two-land and
the bare shells of buildings-may be taxed; everything else in the field of
industrial real estate will be eliminated from taxation as "machinery and
equipment." Is this what the legislature desires?
Can the legislature, on the other hand, expect local tax officials to
apply such subjective and uncertain tests as removability and the intent of
the parties in arriving at what is taxable and non-taxable in business prop-
erties? Assuming neither of these solutions is considered satisfactory, a
possible solution would be to provide tax relief for all industrial property,
estate, including land and buildings, whose owners or users the legislature
considered entitled to favored treatment, and to provide for such relief in the
form of a lower tax rate in relation to the rate set for other property.6 This
should, at once, dispel the enormously complicated and administratively costly
and impracticable task of distinguishing between "machinery and equip-
ment" and other property, and it would present to the public, and to its
servants responsible for budget and revenue estimating and planning, an
intelligible picture of what is going on.
and 50% of the value of industrial real estate, whatever that value may be. In some
instances, depending upon the nature of the business, the value of the machinery and
equipment certainly comprises more than half the total value of the premises if the
broad interpretation considered herein is applied.
64. Appeal of Borough of Aliquippa-Tax of Jones & Laughlin Steel Company,
June, 1959, No. 349, Beaver County, Pa., Nov. 29, 1960.
65. 312 Pa. 433, 167 Att. 321 (1933).
66. There are legislative precedents for this in Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, § 25900 (1897); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 25894 (1931). This would place the
favored treatment of industrial realty on safe constitutional ground, a position which
the current exemptive provisions, as previously observed, do not enjoy. See also




At the same time, the legislature should settle the question whether it
meant, by the use of the term "industrial establishment," to grant local realty
tax relief to all business establishments. If so, the word "business" should be
substituted for "industrial"' to remove this doubt. If favored treatment is
not to be allowed to all business activities, some limitations on "industrial"
are in order. Should the relief be limited to "manufacturers"-those who,
by the application of capital, skill and labor, "transform materials into a
new and different product"? Shall it include those firms which perform
service activities for manufacturers? Shall it also include firms engaged in
canning fruit and vegetables, cutting and packaging meat, bottling soft
drinks? None of these firms has been held to be exempt from tax as a
"manufacturer" under other taxing provisions in the Commonwealth, but
this does not mean that they should not be considered if such relief is to be
granted to anyone. And what of laundries, restaurants, hotels and places of
amusement? All retail and wholesale establishments? Here one reaches the
point of all business activities.
The shrubbery which has sprouted from the 1953 amendments obscur-
ing the administration of local taxes for public education and other essential
public services should be trimmed from the law. Surely we have awakened
in this decade to a greater sense of public responsibility than the accom-
plishment of tax exemptions by obfuscation and legal administrative trickery
and should now be willing to face the issues of taxation and tax exemption
squarely on their merits. Public education is at stake here in more ways than
one; local education depends upon local tax support, but beyond this, an
understanding of local tax issues is basic to the better education we all need
in the problems and functions of our local government. This is possible only
if we can start from a basis of candor and information in our laws and their
administration.
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